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POLICING THE COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: COMBINING SOLIDARITY 
AND SELF-RESPONSIBILITY 
Olivier Moreteau • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
l .  Personal experience sometimes happens to coincide with preexist­
ing expertise. The author of this Article has worked on the topic of com­
pensation of victims, of terrorism in particular, 1 and catastrophes in gen­
eral, 2 in the context of French law, and also in the framework of 
comparative law projects. In August 2005, he left his previous position as 
professor of comparative law in Lyon to move with his family to the United 
States and, more precisely, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
2. This move was three weeks before Hurricane Katrina, one of the 
strongest hurricanes ever recorded on the Atlantic Ocean, made landfall in 
South Louisiana. A large shipping container, sheltering most of the family 
and household belongings, including a multi-thousand-volume professional 
and personal library, happened to be stranded on a railway-track in New Or­
leans, where it was flooded and abandoned for more than two months, caus-
* Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair, Director of the 
Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; formerly 
Professor of Law, Universite Jean Moulin Lyon 3 and Director of the Edouard Lambert Institute 
of Comparative Law. This Article was first published in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007), with the 
support of the European Center of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL), together with the Research 
Unit for European Tort Law of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The author is grateful to the 
ECTIL and the Editors for authorizing a second, updated and expanded publication. Thanks are 
also due to Robert A. Pascal for his help on an earlier version, and to Chris Hannan, Jeff J. Keiser, 
Ellen Overmyer Lloyd, and Agustin Parise for their research and editing. 
I. See, e.g .. Olivier Moreteau & Fabien Lafay, Liability for Acts of Terrorism Under French 
Law, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 29 (Bernhard A. 
Koch ed., 2004). 
2. See, e.g . . Olivier Moreteau, Michel Cannarsa & Fabien Lafay, Financial Compensation for 
Victims of Catastrophes, France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 81 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola 
Amodu eds., 2006 ). 
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ing a more than 85% personal loss. Fortunately, the shipment was insured, 
compensating at least the loss of the items that had a commercial value. 
Leaving personal feelings aside, one legitimately may wonder, in an eco­
nomic and legal perspective, whether it makes any difference to the victim 
if he has been harmed by the most devastating disaster in United States his­
tory or merely an individual accident. 
3. Why should we make a distinction? Why have special treatments 
for victims of catastrophes? From a human point of view, a death is a death, 
whatever the cause; it is a disaster, whether individual or collective. A 
flood or a fire may be gigantic or very local, but individual losses are the 
same regardless of the cause. Why should victims of disasters benefit from 
compulsory insurance coverage, compensation funds, and other special 
schemes? 
4. Why help people who choose to live in flood-prone or earthquake­
prone areas with reinsurance, to keep the risk insurable where insurance 
companies would simply refuse to cover the risk? Why not tell them in­
stead that their risks will not be insured unless they move to less dangerous 
places? After all, citizens in New Orleans knew the damage from hurri­
canes could be serious. 
5. Yet, one may look at things from a different perspective and take 
into account two series of factors. First, large-scale disasters may result in a 
huge cost in human lives: 15,000 people died in Bhopal, India, in 1984 as a 
consequence of the gas leak at the Union Carbide plant;3 the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 people in New York and Wash­
ington; and the South-Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004 swept away 
some 230,000 people.4 Hurricane Katrina killed at least 1,400, and there 
were still some 700 missing one year later.5 Destruction may be extremely 
costly, reaching a compound total of 80 billion dollars in the case of 
Katrina,6 more than 25 billion in the case of Hurricane Andrew in 1992,7 
3. The Union Carbide plant leaked deadly Methyl Isocyanate gas during the night of Decem­
ber 3, 1984. The poisonous gas killed thousands of people in the city and around, and thousands 
of people who were injured were still suffering from its effect more than twenty years later. See 
Union Carbide Corp., Bhopal Information Ctr., Chronology, available at http://www.bhopal.com/ 
pdfs/chrono05.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
4. See T. Matthew Ciolek, 2004 Tsunami Disaster-Scholarly and Factual Analyses, ASIAN 
STUDIES WWW VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 2005, http://www.ciolek.com/WWWVLPages/AsiaPages/ 
Tsunami-Analyses.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
5. See La. Dep't of Health & Hospitals, Hurricane Katrina, Deceased Reports, Reports of 
Missing and Deceased: August 2, 2006, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp? 
ID=l92&Detail=5248 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
6. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Fact Sheet: Noteworthy Records of the 
2008] Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes 67 
and 1.8 billion euros in Toulouse, France, following the explosion of the 
8 AZF factory. 
6. Various causes of destruction may be vast and may affect both pri­
vate homes and public or collective equipment. They have a high collective 
disruptive effect and a huge emotional impact far beyond the affected area. 
Additional damage must be taken into account, such as homelessness, lack 
or shortage of medical care, shortage of water or food, and often lack of 
administration and police protection. People's lives are changed during 
long periods of time, living in temporary shelters years after an earthquake 
or, in the United States, in FEMA trailers almost three years after Hurricane 
Katrina.9 More than one year after Katrina, many New Orleans' citizens are 
still having difficulty accessing normal supplies, education, or employ-
10 ment. 
7. Second, the consequences of catastrophes, aside from the catastro­
phes themselves, are largely man-made, such as terror attacks and industrial 
disasters. Conversely, however, some disasters are totally natural, like tsu­
namis, hurricanes, or earthquakes. Overall, most catastrophes are a combi­
nation of natural forces and human activity, such as the devastation of New 
Orleans in 2005. In all, the city fared rather well under the hurricane-force 
winds and downpour. However, the weakness of ill-designed levees and 
the absence of gates to shut the canals linking Lake Pontchartrain to the 
Mississippi River caused the city to be submerged by the storm surge in the 
lake. 11 The same may be said of the oil-spill disasters such as the wrecks of 
the Exxon Valdez in 1989, of the Erika in 1999, and of the Prestige in 2002: 
2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/ 
s2540b.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
7. Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastro­
phes, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 342, � 46 n.166 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola 
Amodu eds., 2006). 
8. As a consequence of the explosion of a chemical plant called AZF (owned by Total Fina 
Elf) that was located in Toulouse, France, 30 people died, 5,000 suffered personal injury, and 
thousands of private and public buildings were damaged. The scene after the explosion was as if a 
large part of suburban Toulouse had been bombed. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 
2, at 81. 
9. See, e.g., Becky Bohrer, Assoc. Press, Nagin: Katrina Anniversary Goa/for Getting Rid of 
FEMA Trailers, KA TC.COM, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.katc.com/globaVstory.asp?s 
=8022162 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
10. For a current survey of the situation in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, see U.S. Dep't 
of Homeland Security, Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing?, http://www.dhs.gov/xpre 
presp/programs/gc_l 157649340100.shtm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
11. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Engineers Faulted on Hu"icane System, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2007, at A013. 
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they were all caused by the combined effect of a tempest and human negli­
gence. 
8. Fatalities and losses in a catastrophe are not simply caused by indi­
vidual choices that may lead to ordinary accidents, such as driving a smaller 
and less protective car to save on gas, engaging in a dangerous sports activ­
ity, or smoking in bed. Instead, fatalities and losses in a catastrophe are 
strongly linked to collective choices, political or economical, and to human 
contingencies that may not be ignored in the present context; not everyone 
may live on top of Mount Ararat to avoid the consequences of a possible 
deluge. Slopes may be unsafe because of the risk of landslide, and yet 
many people may have no better housing option. Unless they settle in un­
reasonable places, can we blame people for living in flood-prone plains? 
Most agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity develops in plains, 
alongside rivers used for irrigation and as waterways. Coastal ports have 
always been a haven for vibrant activity, from fishing to carriage of goods 
and passengers. Further, volcanoes fertilize the surrounding land and supply 
rich minerals and waters, to the benefit of people who live much further 
away. 
9. Such choices result in human activity that makes pre-existing natu­
ral risks more threatening. For example, moving to Florida to age gracefully 
under the sun can increase the damage caused by natural events if crowds of 
people pursue the same idea. Further, channeling a huge river such as the 
Mississippi between high levees, sometimes made of concrete, may have 
the effect of protecting big cities and millions of people. However, at the 
same time, it may also deprive vast plains of necessary alluvia and cause the 
Gulf of Mexico's coastal region to be deprived of the barrier of low islands 
that once protected the New Orleans region against forceful hurricanes.12 
10. In light of these factors, should we decide upfront the collective 
answer to what is a collective problem? For instance, considering that half 
of New Orleans' residents did not have flood insurance coverage, should 
we blame the victims of this catastrophe for not taking insurance wherever 
available. Just as many citizens of New Orleans were uninsured in the 
wake of Katrina, in Toulouse it was found that 15% of the victims of the 
AZF factory explosion did not have homeowners insurance.13 
12. This theory was discussed in detail by John M. Barry at a luncheon address for the Cen­
tennial celebration of the Louisiana State University (LSU) Law Center on September 15, 2006. 
For further information, see JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 
1927 AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (Simon & Schuster 1 997). 
13. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 81. 
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11. Even if more residents maintained insurance coverage, insurance 
providers may nevertheless treat the claimed damages as uninsurable, and 
exclude some of the risks associated with an area or activity. This pattern is 
especially apparent after insurance companies have been faced with a large 
scale disaster, which put a number of insurance companies out of business. 
An example of this reaction and outcome occurred in Florida after Hurri­
cane Andrew in 1992.14 
12. Beyond individual claims, it is important to recognize that the ef­
fects of a catastrophe impact private and public entities alike. For example, 
who can deny that the Port of South Louisiana, stretching from New Or­
leans to Baton Rouge, is the largest volume shipping port in the Western 
Hemisphere and the fourth largest in the world?1 Who can deny the enor­
mous contribution of Louisiana in the supply of oil and gas, to the benefit of 
the rest of the American nation? It can be ar�ued that protection of this re­
gion should be regarded as a national priority. 6 
13. A catastrophe is much more than the sum of individual disasters, 
especially when it is large-scale. Yet, how do we define such disasters? 
Scales exist that measure the intensity of an earthquake and the destructive 
strength of a hurricane, but there is no general scale to measure catastro­
phes. Instead, we are left with the obvious observation that catastrophes af­
fect a large number of people at one time and cause long-term disrupting 
consequences for the survivors. And, despite judgment by some after the 
fact, for most victims the impact of such catastrophes was unavoidable by 
sound individual choice. 
14. Does this mean that society should inform potential victims of dis­
asters that they may only rely on their individual choices and on the market 
forces to prevent, cure, or insure the consequences of catastrophes? Such 
an attitude is predominant in the United States, a society that relies on the 
individual and is organized from the bottom up. Americans often turn to 
their local municipality when unable to cope with the effects of a catastro­
phe. From there, a municipality may call upon county (or parish if in Lou­
isiana) officials, then the state; and only if the state cannot cope may it re­
sort to aid from the federal government. Within such a model, the State 
plays a limited regulatory function, ensuring that social and economic ac-
14. For further discussion of the reactions to Hurricane Andrew, see infra ml 30-31. 
15. Port of South Louisiana, Transp. Ctr. of the Americas, Port Overview, http://www.portsl.c 
om/pages/I 5_overview.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) ("The Port of South Louisiana, which 
stretches 54 miles along the Mississippi River, is the largest tonnage port district ... in the West­
ern Hemisphere."). 
16. See BARRY, supra note 12. 
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tors can interact in a legally safe and competitive environment, and inter­
venes only in large scale emergencies. 
15. Should we expect state authorities to be proactive and to take pre­
ventive steps, to organize and regulate the compensation of victims ex ante? 
This is a predominant attitude in many European countries, especially in 
France, where solidarity matters more than prosperity.17 In fact, most 
French people seem to believe that too much competition triggers exclu­
sion. In times past, the poor and the weak in France used to call on the lord 
or the king for protection. After the French Revolution, however, such calls 
shifted to the State administration. Today, French society remains organ­
ized from the top-down, and the State is expected to care for the people. 
Extensive State intervention is not only acceptable; it is constantly re­
quested by the people. 
16. This Article is not intended to discuss the respective merits of 
market economy and regulated economy, nor the respective value of soli­
darity as against self-responsibility. Rather, as contended below, both often 
coexist in the United States and in France. France promotes self­
responsibility by giving incentives to people to insure their risks. In com­
parison, the United States promotes solidarity by giving tax exemptions on 
money donated to help victims of catastrophes, 18 by creating a fund for the 
September 11 victims, 19 and by voting for billions of federal dollars to be 
spent on catastrophe victims.20 
17. The purpose of this Article is to provide a comparison of the 
American and French systems for compensating catastrophe victims. First, 
under the American model, ex ante reliance on individual and market forces 
is completed by government intervention and is followed by huge ex post 
solidarity. Second, under the French model, preventive efforts openly com­
bine the action of individuals, market forces, and State intervention, there­
fore limiting public expenditure after the event. The American and French 
models are chosen not only due to the fact that they are not totally unknown 
17. The Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, referred to in the Preamble to the pre­
sent Constitution of 1958, states: "[T]he solidarity and equality of all French people as to the 
charge resulting from national calamities." See 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (stating at paragraph 12: 
"la solidarite et l'egalite de tous Jes Fran�ais devant Jes charges qui resultent des calamites natio­
nales"). 
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agen­
cy (FEMA), Tax Relief for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees (No. R4-05-149) (Oct. 5, 2005), available 
at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=l9443 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
19. 49 u.s.c. § 40101 (2007). 
20. Eric Lipton, Leaders in Congress Agree on Aid for Gulf Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2005, at A529. 
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to the present contributor and well documented,21 but also because they are 
the most typical in their categories. Thus, each system will be surveyed in 
turn. 
II. THE AMERICAN MODEL: MAKING COMPENSATION 
AVAILABLE 
18. The American system relies predominantly on individual and local 
action, with obvious downsides when it comes to the management of large­
scale disasters. Examples of incentives will be given, showing that at both 
the federal and state levels, efforts are made to make compensation avail­
able, usually by way of private insurance. Despite such measures, however, 
even in the United States, the government has become a major player in ca­
tastrophe compensation. 
A. THE DOWNSIDE OF RELIANCE ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND ON LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES 
19. The American system attempts to focus on providing compensa­
tion for catastrophe victims and increasing accessibility of catastrophe cov­
erage for all individuals who are in need of such protection. The American 
social welfare system is underdeveloped in comparison to most European 
countries. Further, the role of tort law is predominant, not only as a gap­
filler where no other recourse is available, but also because the American 
mindset is that only the tortfeasor should have to pay. While a Frenchman 
requests public help, an American searches for a tortfeasor to hold respon­
sible for damages. 
20. This reliance on bringing suit to require a tortfeasor to pay dam­
ages serves not only a personal, but a public policy function that helps to 
keep American society safe. In theory, this plaintiff-friendly procedural 
system increases the ease of accessing justice. The indigent victim having a 
good cause of action is expected to find a lawyer willing to be paid on a 
contingency fee basis. Damages are assessed by juries comprised of ordi­
nary citizens, who often easily identify and sympathize with the victim. 
Thus, damages are likely to be high. Even after deducting 30% for attorne� 
fees, 22 the victim is generously compensated. Class actions are favored 3 
21. See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7. 
22. In the "standard" contemporary contingency fee arrangement, the lawyer collects roughly 
a third of his or her client's recovery in the case, although this standard rule has many variations 
and exceptions. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency 
Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 757-61 (2002). 
23. See Linda S. Mullenix, Developments in the Procedural Means for Resolution of Mass 
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and punitive damages are allowed; each serving the same policing function 
and assistance towards eliminating noxious activities. In essence, a clear 
incentive to litigate exists, even when insurance coverage does not. 
21. The trouble with natural disasters is that no recourse to tort law­
suits is available in a large number of instances. Yet, as suggested above, 
many natural disasters are also man-made. For instance, the New Orleans' 
victims of Hurricane Katrina have identified the Army Corps of Engineers 24 
as a possible defendant in a potentially large class action suit, such as the 
one filed on July 12, 2006.25 Some obvious mistakes in the conception of 
the levee system, a system for which the Corps of Engineers was responsi­
ble, have been demonstrated.26 These mistakes have been pointed to as 
largely explaining the failure that cost so many lives and massive destruc­
tion by the effect of prolonged tlooding.27 
22. On January 30, 2008, the United States District Court for the East­
ern District of Louisiana dismissed the consolidated class action against the 
Corps of Engineers, but not without an at least implicit recognition of the 
Corps' role in the catastrophe.28 In this opinion, Judge Duval stated: 
While the United States government is immune for legal liability for 
the defalcations alleged herein, it is not free, nor should it be, from 
posterity's judgment concerning its failure to accomplish what was its 
task .... 
The cruel irony here is that the Corps cast a blind eye, either as a result 
Tort Litigation in the United States, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A 
COMPARATIVE SURVEY 204 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004). 
24. The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering services to the United 
States, both for military and civil purposes. See U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, Who We Are, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/who/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). The agency's responsibilities in­
clude the levees that are intended to protect New Orleans from flooding. 
25. See Charles Savoy v. United States, No. 06-3552, (E.D. La. filed July 12, 2006). See also 
McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, Hurricane Law Blog: News and Opinion from the Recovery in the 
Gulf States, MR-GO Class Action Against Corps of Engineers, http://www.hurricanelawblog. 
corn/archives/la-litigation-actions-filed-mrgo-class-action-against-corps-of-engineers.html (July 
18, 2006) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
26. See IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA-THE INSIDE STORY FROM ONE LOUISIANA SCIENTIST 211-49 
(2006). 
27. See id. 
28. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 643 (E.D. La. 
2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20080 l 30_Dismissal_ 
Order.pdf (last visited March 26, 2008). 
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of executive directives or bureaucratic parsimony, to flooding caused 
by drainage needs and until otherwise directed by Congress, solely fo­
cused on flooding caused by storm surge. Nonetheless, damage caused 
by either type of flooding is ultimately borne by the same public fisc. 
Such egregious myopia is a caricature of bureaucratic inefficiency. 
It is not within this Court's power to address the wrongs committed. It 
is hopefully within the citizens of the United States' power to address 
the failures of our laws and agencies. If not, it is certain that another 
tragedy such as this will occur again.29 
23. Alternatives to the courts for catastrophe victims are private or 
public insurance or public disaster relief programs, such as those adminis-30 tered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). To ac-
cess FEMA aid, the governor of the state in which the disaster occurred 
must declare a state of emergency and formally request from the President 
of the United States that FEMA and the Federal government respond to the 
disaster.31 Unfortunately, the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew that swe�t 
through South Florida proved that this system was not reactive enough. 2 
The primary issue with this system is that it requires foresight by local au­
thorities at an early stage to assess whether the anticipated effects of the 
disaster will exceed their management capacity. The flaw in this scheme 
became glaringly apparent during Hurricane Katrina, when both the Mayor 
of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana failed to call early enough 
for federal help.33 While the American federal system works very satisfac­
torily to stimulate competition and profit, the response to Hurricane Katrina 
shows that it may not be all that fit to respond national emergencies.34 As a 
29. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 643. 
30. FEMA was created in 1979 under President Carter to coordinate the response to a disaster 
occurring in the United States and overwhelming the resources of local and state authorities. It 
operated as an independent agency until the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 
2003 as a response by President George W. Bush to the September 11 terrorist attacks. For further 
information on the role of FEMA and its interaction with federal and state government, see Rabin 
& Bratis, supra note 7, ,, 13-25. 
31. 42. U.S.C. § 5170 (2007) ("All requests for a declaration by the President that a major 
disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State."). 
32. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iMf 46-54. 
33. See, e.g., Editorial, Bob Williams, Blame Amid the Tragedy: Gov. Blanco and Mayor 
Nagin Failed Their Constituents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7 2005, at A28. 
34. See The Becker-Posner Blog: A Blog by Gary Becker and Richard Posner, Federalism, 
Economics, and Katrina-Richard Posner, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/IO/ 
federalism_econ.html (Oct. 9, 2005, 19:30 CST) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). Concluding that: 
(W)hile state and local government can and should be given exclusive responsibility for re­
sponding to run-of-the-mill local emergencies, the federal government should have standby 
responsibility for regional and (of course) national emergencies, as well as for emergencies 
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result of this maladministration, FEMA reacted in an untimely manner, 
which left New Orleans residents in an unacceptable state of distress and 
increased the number of fatalities. The Administrator of FEMA was forced 
to resign over such issues, and it remains to be seen if the excuses provided 
by the President of the United States will fix the problem. Several class ac­
tions were filed against FEMA shortly after the event. 35 
24. There is no intent to investigate the public insurance schemes in 
the present Article. Such a topic is all too complex and patchwork-like and 
has already been documented in the context of catastrophes.36 While public 
schemes may provide relief in cases of individual accidents, such as disabil­
ity and unemployment, it is well known that the public welfare system is 
underdeveloped in the United States. Instead, much reliance is placed on 
private insurance to protect people from the contingencies of life, with sub­
stantial government incentives to make coverage possible and available. 
8. RELIANCE ON INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES 
25. When it comes to private insurance coverage, there are a greater 
number of options. Private insurance may cover personal injury in the form 
of life, health, and disability insurance. It also may cover damage to prop­
erty in the form of homeowner insurance and commercial casualty insur­
ance. In general, these policies cover all risks, regardless of the cause of the 
loss. However, recent events have revealed gaps in commercial insurance 
coverage due to resistance by private insurers to cover damages related to 
disasters.37 In response, governmental regulations, both at the federal and 
state level, have been enacted to increase the availability of private insur­
ance coverage for disasters. Examples of such incentives, both at federal 
and state level, can be supplied in sufficient numbers to prove that this is 
not an exceptional practice. 
Id. 
26. One such federal example is the Price-Anderson Act, passed· in 
that, as in the case of the flooding of New Orleans as a result of Katrina, wreak destruction 
on a scale that it would not have been efficient for the local government to prepare to meet. 
35. See, e.g., Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quaran­
tines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 121 (2007) (citing Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform 
Now v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding a denial of due process guarantees 
from FEMA to hurricane evacuees); McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-26 (E.D. La. 
2005) (finding violations of constitutional rights and relief statutes)). 
36. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, ,, 6-12. 
37. See, e.g., Peter G. Gosselin, Insurers Learn to Pinpoint Risks-and Avoid Them, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A 1. 
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1957 by Congress, 38 with the express purpose of encouraging private devel­
opment of nuclear energy in the United States. The Act created a mixed 
system: a compulsory private insurance coverage scheme combined with an 
emergency compensation fund. A cap was placed on the total amount of 
liability that each reactor operator would have to face in the event of a nu­
clear accident. 39 Participation in this program is compulsory for all nuclear 
reactor operators.40 The intent of this act was purely proactive. In fact, 
when the Act was first passed, no tragedy had yet occurred; the act's pas­
sage was long before the meltdown at Three Mile Island (1979)41 and the 
tragedy of Chernobyl ( 1986). 42 Despite the proactive stance of this legisla­
tion, the threat of ruinous tort litigation was a barrier to private investment 
in this new promising industry.43 
27. The most striking example of a large2' proactive incentive, how­
ever, is the National Flood Insurance Program. Administered by FEMA, 
the program was established in 1968 in response to the private insurance 
industry's reluctance to sell flood coverage. Although the chance of flood­
ing is geographically limited with the pool of potential purchasers of flood 
insurance, which is restricted to people living in floodplain areas, only peo­
ple with less desirable risks and higher potential losses are likely to insure. 
Given this small pool of interested buyers, it is difficult for the insurance 
providers to spread the risk in a satisfactory way.45 As a result, Congress 
intended the National Flood Insurance Program to ensure availability of 
flood insurance where needed, while encouraging disaster mitigation 
through incentives to restrict development on flood-prone lands.46 
28. Specific details of the National Flood Insurance program include: 
( 1) the program is voluntary; (2) communities that choose to participate 
must implement land management and practices in compliance with federal 
38. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 22 10 (2006). 
39. See id.§§ 22JO(e)( l )-(7). 
40. For further discussion, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 28. 
41. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Fact Sheet: Three Mile Island Accident 
(2007), a\•ailab/e at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
42. See World Nuclear Ass'n, Chernobyl Accident, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/cher 
nobyl/inf07 .htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
43. For a detailed history of the successes and failures of the Price-Anderson Act, see Dan N. 
Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legis/ation?-The Sixty-Three Mi//ion Dol­
lar Question, 1 3  HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I (1989). 
44. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129 (2006). 
45. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 33-34. 
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 400 l (d)-(e). 
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guidelines; (3) eligibility for national flood insurance is limited to residents 
of participating communities; (4) residents are generally free to purchase 
insurance or not, but insurance is mandatory in some cases;47 and (5) federal 
agencies are barred from providing flood-related disaster assistance loans or 
grants to property located within identified hazard areas unless the commu­
nity is participating in the program.48 Moreover, the federal government as­
sumes the role of primary insurer by covering the risk of financial loss as­
sociated with a disastrous flood under the flood insurance scheme. Private 
insurers collect premiums and settle all claims, but if the losses stemming 
from a flood event exceed the premiums collected by the private insurer, the 
government steps in and compensates the insured for losses in excess.49 As 
noted by Robert Rabin and Suzanne Bratis: 
Since the program was started in 1969, it has paid $11. 9 billion in 
claims. In the absence of the Program, this cost would have been 
borne by the taxpayers through federal disaster assistance funding or 
by the victims individually. In addition, by requiring communities to 
comply with FEMA floodplain management standards as a condition 
of participation, FEMA estimates that the program saves $1 billion per 
. 'd d d 50 year m avot e amages. 
This program shows how much State intervention aimed at prevention 
can protect those who need and deserve it, while saving money for every­
one-since solidarity always comes into play ex post facto, in a costly and 
less effective manner on account of the collective emotion caused by disas­
ters. 
29. Another more recent example arose as a reaction to the terrorist at­
tacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.51 
Shortly after the event, a Victim Compensation Fund was created to provide 
prompt and fair compensation to the victims of the attacks and their fami-
47. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 33. 
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 4106. 
49. For a general description of the National Flood Insurance Program administered by 
FEMA, see FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM; 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: AUGUST 1, 2002 22-29 (2002), available at http://www.fema.gov/librar 
y/file?type=publ ishedF ile&file=nfipdescrip_ l _.pdf& fileid==e6fdab40-80bd-11 db-9aa6000bdba87 
d5b (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
50. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 332, � 34. 
51. See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, mf 29-30; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for 
Acts of Terrorism Under U.S. law, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY 176 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004); Kevin P. Hilliard, Civil Litigation Arising out of the 
WTC Attacks, in TERRORJSM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 189 (Bern­
hard A. Koch ed., 2004). 
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lies, in order to address injury and fatality claims that totaled nearly $7 bil­
lion.52 Insurance companies were called to pay huge amounts. By October 
2003, they had received more than 35,000 claims (including personal proIJ­
erty and business interruption claims) representing a total of $19 billion.53 
This raised concerns as to the solvency of the American insurance industry. 
In response to such concerns, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 200i4 
was passed to provide a cap on the losses for which the private insurance 
industry will be responsible in the event of a major act of terrorism. Under 
this act, the federal government assumes the role of excess liability insurer, 
beyond a threshold of $5 million per event that qualifies as an "act of terror­
ism,'' to cover 90% of the losses in excess within a $100 billion annual ag-
1. . 55 gregate 1m1t. 
30. Other examples of incentives can be found at the state level. The 
existence of such programs demonstrates that the government has become a 
major player in reacting to major disasters and preventing problems. for the 
future. For example, consider the state of Florida, struck in August 1992 by 
Hurricane Andrew. Until then, Hurricane Hugo of 1989 ranked as the cost­
liest tropical storm in terms of insured damages. In fact, as noted by Rabin 
and Bratis: "The insurance industry used the $4 billion of insured losses 
caused by Hugo as a basis for assessing their future risks."56 This baseline, 
however, was rendered obsolete by the $17 billion of insured losses caused 
by Hurricane Andrew. 
31. After Andrew, a number of small insurers went bankrupt and 
many companies moved to stop covering hurricane-related losses.57 Rein­
surers also sought to limit coverage and raised both premiums and deducti­
ble rates.58 To address the inability of its residents' to obtain hurricane in­
surance coverage, the government of Florida forced private insurers to 
continue offering hurricane coverage at affordable rates. Moreover, the 
state created the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting As-
52. Peter H. Woodin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, in TERRORISM, 
TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 197 (Bernhard A Koch ed., 2004). See 
also Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iMJ 29, 38-45. 
53. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 'If 29. 
54. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)). 
55. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 'If 30. 
56. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 333, 'If 36. 
57. See Mireya Navarro, Storms Expose Florida's Vulnerability, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at 
Al2. 
58. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 'If 36. 
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sociation, which became the second largest insurer in Florida.59 
32. California offers another interesting example of government inter­
vention. In 1994, the Northridge earthquake caused more than $15 billion 
in insured losses, causing many insurers to move out of the business, much 
as they did in Florida after Hurricane Andrew.60 The state tried to find solu­
tions to protect the citizens against earthquake-related losses, while simul­
taneously protecting the state's insurance industry. As a result, the Califor­
nia Earthqua�e Authority (CEA) was created in 1996.6 1 Under a somewhat 
complicated scheme,62 private insurers that sell "residential property insur­
ance"63 in California are allowed to exclude earthquake-related losses from 
their standard coverage, but are required to offer earthquake insurance in 
some form. Wherever they do not cover the risk, they must notify the cus­
tomer and must make an offer of an independent policy for such coverage.64 
The customer is free to accept or decline the limited coverage: there is no 
requirement to carry earthquake coverage. Where provided, however, cov­
erage must comply with CEA regulations.65 Interestingly, it has been noted 
that "[m]ost residential property insurers-those comprising about 80% of 
the market, including the largest homeowners' insurers in the state-have 
chosen to opt out of providing coverage themselves, and instead simply 
administer policy coverage for the CEA, which assumes primary risk­
bearing responsibility."66 In short, under this system, private insurers play a 
purely administrative role while the CEA assumes the financial risk. 
33. Specifically, the CEA is a privately financed entity, composed of 
insurance companies licensed to do business in California and governed by 
59. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, ii 36. 
60. Rabin & Gratis, supra note 6, ii 31. 
61. CAL. INS. CODE§ 10089.6(a) (West 2008) ("The authority shall be authorized to transact 
insurance in this state as necessary to sell policies of basic residential earthquake insurance .... "). 
62. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iii! 31-32. 
63. Residential property insurance is defined as: 
[A] policy of residential property insurance shall mean a policy insuring individually owned 
residential structures of not more than four dwelling units, individually owned condominium 
units, or individually owned mobile homes, and their contents, located in this state and used 
exclusively for residential purposes or a tenant's policy insuring personal contents of a resi­
dential unit located in this state. Policy of residential property insurance, as defined, shall not 
include insurance for real property or its contents used for any commercial industrial or 
business purpose, except a structure of not more than four dwelling units rent�d for individ­
ual residential purposes. A policy that does not include any of the perils insured against in a 
�tandard fire policy shall not be included in the definition of "policy of residential property 
insurance. 
CAL. INS. CODE§ 10087(a) (West 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. See id. § 10087.5. 
65. See id. § 10089 (establishing minimum coverage and maximum deductibles permitted). 
66. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 328, ii 31. 
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a three-member board of state officials including the Governor, the State 
Treasurer, and the State Insurance Commissioner.67 Participating insurers 
(with mandatory contributions to create the initial operating capital), rein­
surance, and the premiums charged for policies sold all contribute toward 
funding the CEA. 68 The Board is charged with ensuring that the CEA has 
sufficient capital to maintain operations, because there is no state liability to 
pay claims that would exceed the CEA's capability to pay.69 It has been ob­
served that "by establishing a ceiling on the mandated contributions from 
private insurers, and pooling these risks, the CEA represents a model under 
which the state has relieved the private insurers of the uncertainty and po­
tentially catastrophic losses associated with a maj or earthquake,"70 all 
within a system where the state does not pay. However, it should be noted 
that this does not exclude private intervention, where under a similar strat­
egy, "major commercial insurance brokers have created pools of private in­
surers to offer coverage on large commercial properties."7 1  Despite the 
continuing presence of private insurers, the above examples clearly demon­
strate that in the United States, the government has become a major player 
in disaster coverage. 
C. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BECOME A MAJOR PLAYER 
34. Not only in reaction to disasters, such as terrorism, hurricanes, and 
earthquakes, but also as a proactive measure to potential disasters from in­
cidents like nuclear accidents or flooding, the government has become a 
major player in disaster recovery. In this role, the government works to 
prevent the withdrawal of private insurance in entire areas and ensure there 
is sufficient private or public funding to cover major risks. This govern­
ment intervention takes place both at federal and state levels. These pro­
grams often go beyond making private insurance available. In fact, such 
programs pool the risks and sometimes inject substantial public funding, 
such as in the case of terrorism and the National Flood Insurance Program. 
Thus, currently in the United States, there exists a palpable shift from pri­
vate coverage to public funding. 
35. Some may complain that governmental intervention is a bad thing. 
One objection is that such intervention distorts the insurance market, caus­
ing insurance prices and availability to no longer reflect the risk level of the 
67. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.7 (West 2008). 
68. Id. § 1 0089. 15 .  
69. For futher infonnation, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 1[ 32. 
70. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 330, 1[ 32. 
7 1 .  Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 330, 1[ 32. 
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activity.72 The Florida post-Andrew reaction gives a most interesting an­
swer to this objection. Proponents of government intervention point out 
that the state is in a better position than private insurers to bear risks that the 
private sector no longer wants to assume, because the state has broader re­
sources and a larger borrowing capacity. Further, it has been noted that "by 
using regulations to force insurance coverage and premium rates that are 
out of step with the actuarial assessment of the private insurers, the gov­
ernment creates a market in which private insurers are unable to compete, 
even if they wanted to re-enter."73 In the end, there is no market-distortion, 
but rather a new market emerges, where the private sector may remain free 
to intervene, subject to compliance with some rules, such as those seen in 
the above example of California. 
36. Another familiar objection is that "government intervention forces 
the public at large to subsidize the risky lifestyle of a segment of society."74 
There is little doubt that this is a sound argument when addressing the cov­
erage of highly risky individual action totally based on personal choice, 
such as high mountain climbing with light equipment or riding a motorcycle 
wearing shorts and t-shirts.75 However, disasters are likely to happen in 
heavily populated areas where large numbers of people are making a sig­
nificant economic contribution to the general welfare while also benefiting 
those living in less risk-prone places. As pointed out in the introduction to 
this Article,76 no society would be viable if all its members tried to take ref­
uge and prosper in the least risky areas. 77 In addition, due to the global 
wanning phenomenon, it becomes difficult to find reasonably safe places 
anywhere on our planet and impossible to move millions (if not billions) of 
people there, which would inevitably generate huge costs and unknown 
72. Roger van den Bergh, Compulsory Catastrophe Extension of First Party Insurance from a 
Competition Policy Perspective, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: 
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 361 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola Amodu eds., 
2006). 
73. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 334, ii 36. 
74. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 334, ii 36. 
75. See Olivier Moreteau, More Personal Responsibility, in TOPICS: PHARMACEUTICAL 
RISKS, EMERGING RISKS, US TORT LAW 12 (Miinchener Ruck Munich Re Group 2005), available 
at http://www.munichre.de/publications/302-04641_en.pdf(last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
76. See supra ii I 0. 
77. Politicians also call to emotion and imagination, like President George W. Bush in his 
speech at Jackson Square, in New Orleans, a few days after hurricane Katrina: "And all who ques­
tion the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to imagine America without 
New Orleans, and this great city will rise again." See President George W. Bush, Address at Jack­
son Square, New Orleans, La.: President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation 
(Sept. 1 5 , 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/200509 1 58.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
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risks. 
37.  Sol idarity is vital,7s and so is self-responsibility. Both are not con­
flicting values, but at all times complementary, essential social values. The 
U.S. National Flood Insurance Program shows how the two can be intelli­
gently combined in modem policy. In comparison, the French model, 
which is heavily based on state regulation and the promotion of solidarity, 
similarly shows how the compensation of the victims of catastrophes can be 
based on a careful combination of collective solidarity and individual self­
responsibility. 
III. THE FRENCH MODEL: REGULATING COMPENSATION 
3 8 .  France regards itself as a welfare state. Solidarity is a constitu­
tional value,79 as it is in Italy and in some other European countries.so Ad­
mittedly, the French way may have its downsides, for instance when it re­
duces authoritatively the working time to thirty-five hours a week, 
supposedly to promote the creation of new jobs, but thereby putting so 
many small businesses in a precarious situation that existing jobs are jeop­
ardized. s 1 Likewise, French law looks as if it generously protects employ­
ees through increased job protection by making it difficult to dismiss em­
ployees. Yet, in so doing, the French system makes the job market less 
accessible for the unemployed. 
39. Regarding the victims of disasters, actual or potential, solidarity is 
clearly promoted in France. In fact, the Preamble of the French Constitu­
tion affirms "the solidarity and equality of all French people as to the 
charge resulting from national calamities."s2 Thus, government policy takes 
care not only of the consequences of death and personal injury, but also of 
the compensation for damage to property. Yet, clear incentives are also 
given to preventive measures, promoting self-responsibility. Despite these 
benefits, the "French exception" admittedly has had associated costs, like 
1 5,000 elderly people dying as a consequence of the formidable heat wave 
78. And it is primarily private, as seen after every catastrophe. 
79. See 1 946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). 
80. See Alberto Monti & Filippo Andrea Chiaves, Financial Compensation for Victims of Ca­
tastrophes, Italy, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 145, ii 3 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola Amodu eds., 
2006); see generally STEINAR STJERN0, SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
8 1 .  See Philip Delves Broughton, French 35-Hour Week "a Disaster, " DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(LONDON), May 18, 2004, § News, at 14. 
82. See 1 946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). 
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during the summer of 2003.83 This disaster triggered a national debate and 
political action as to the fate of elderly people in a post-industrial society. 
A. DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY 
40. Victims will always benefit from the French social security sys­
tem, covering most medical expenses in case of personal injury. This sys­
tem, known as the Securite sociale, is open to all and accessible regardless 
of the origin of the damage. However, compensation is minimal in the case 
of death and permanent disability, which creates an incentive to rely on tort 
suits for adequate compensation, 84 unless the victim or the dependants may 
rely on the new insurance coverage for accidents of private life that was 
proposed in the year 2000. 
41 .  Under the name garantie accidents de la vie (literally, "guarantee 
against life accidents"), insurance companies offer almost full coverage of 
the consequences of death (for the dependants) or physical injury when 
such damage occurs in the course of private life, whether at home or out­
side.85 The cost is minimal, starting as low as € 1 5  per month for full family 
86 coverage. The covered damage may be the consequence of a natural or 
technological catastrophe, a terrorist attack, or a medical risk, as long as 
some outside event caused the accident.87 The compensation is usually lim­
ited to a maximum amount of €1 million.88 It also covers the compensation 
of economic loss, loss of amenity and pain and suffering.89 
42. The garantie accidents de la vie is almost a novelty in France.  
Two major mutual insurance companies offered similar and yet not as ex­
tended coverage in the past. 90 It is unprecedented in Europe, in the sense 
83. See Thomas Crampton, Record Heat Wilts Europe, Strains Power Supply and Hurts 
Crops, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at Al .  
84. For further infonnation, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ,, 5 ,  12-17 . 
85. See BUREAU OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITIEE ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION, REPORT ON 
INDEMNJFJYING VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY FOR THE EUROPEAN 
COMMITIEE ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION 1 1- 1 3  (November 27, 2006) available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/ e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/steering_committees/cdcj/cj-s-vict/CDCJ­
BU%20(2006)%20 l 9%20e%20-%20ECTIL %20Report.pdf (last visited March 26, 2008). 
86. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, , 6 .  
87. See The French GA V® Accident Compensation, SCOR TECHNICAL NEWSL. (SCOR 
Group, Paris, France), Oct. 2003, at 2, available at http://www.scor.com/www/fileadmin/uploads/ 
publics/NTNV2003_05_en_tuknv05.pdf(last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. For an exhaustive history of the insurance industry in France, see Bertrand Venard, The 
French Insurance Market: Background and Trends, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSURANCE: BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 241 -96 (J. David 
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that it provides full coverage, as in a case of tort liability, and it also covers 
non-pecuniary damages. Instead of relying on the Welfare State, people are 
offered an affordable option geared at protecting them against the harsh 
consequences of daily life or less foreseeable accidents. In that sense, self­
responsibility is promoted. 
43. French tort law may be described as victim friendly, yet restrictive 
in terms of victim compensation. Among its benefits, the system is easily 
accessible with access such as legal aid to help the indigent. In addition, 
the cost of justice is much lower in France than in the United States and 
other common law countries. For those relying on the tort system,91 which 
may be possible only where a potentially liable party is identified, strict li­
ability may be more generously available than in other legal systems where 
caps may exist that limit the amount of damages to be awarded. One down­
side, however, is that French courts are not generous in awarding damages, 
especially the administrative courts hearing disputes where the defendant is 
a government or public authority.92 In addition, like most civil law jurisdic­
tions, the French system does not allow class actions.93 
44. Examples may be found where public authorities have been made 
liable for damage caused by a natural disaster. For instance, after the 
Grand-Bomans flooding, that killed twenty-three people in the Alps in the 
summer of 1 987 and caused significant property damage, the State and lo­
cal authorities were made jointly liable and had to pay compensation to the 
victims or their families; the State for lack of care in authorizing the devel­
opment of a camping ground in an area likely to be flooded by the mountain 
torrent, and the local authorities for failure to warn of the possible dan-
94 gers. 
45.  These possibilities for victim compensation are not limited to 
cases of catastrophes. However, the only disaster specific scheme to cover 
the consequences of death and personal injury is the Compensation Fund 
Cummins & Bertrand Venard eds., 2007). 
9 1 .  For further information, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 'IM! 30-38. 
92. For a current survey and criticism of the standards governing recovery of damages in 
French tort law, see David Corbe-Chalon & Martin A. Rogoff, Tort Reform A La Francaise: 
Jurisprndential and Policy Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injury in France, 13 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 23 1 (2007). 
93. For a discussion of the current debate in France and throughout the European Union on 
introducing the procedural mechanism of the class action, see Gary L. Gassman & Perry S. Gran­
off, Global Issues Affecting Securities Claims at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 43 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2007). 
94. [CAA] (Administrative Court of Appeal), Lyon, 1 3  May 1 997, Droit admnistrat(f (Dr. 
adm.) July 1997, 7; Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 37. 
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for victims of terrorism.95 The Compensation Fund for the victims of ter­
rorist action and other offenses was created in 1 98696 in response to a num­
ber of terrorist attacks in the early and mid- 1 980s. It is funded by a levy on 
the insurance premiums paid for the coverage of damage to property, such 
as automobile or homeowner insurance. An additional €3 .30 is paid per 
contract. 97 It covers all French citizens who are a victim of a terrorist attack 
in France or abroad, in addition to all foreign victims of terrorist attacks oc­
curring in French territories, even in cases where the terrorists have been 
identified and prosecuted. 98 This is further evidence of a solidarity policy. 
46. The Fund offers full compensation for personal injury, and addi­
tionally, compensation for pain and suffering and consequential loss not re­
lated to property.99 Compensated victims are granted the status of victim of 
war, with all the rights and benefits inherent to such status. 100 This includes 
totally free medical care (a share of which is otherwise supported by bene­
fits a patient may receive from Securite sociale) and the benefit of a pen­
sion, in addition to compensation. 101  In case of death, the dependants are 
compensated for their economic loss. 102 
47. Additionally, the system provides victims with full compensation 
within just a few weeks, without complex and lengthy proceedings. There 
is a ten-year period for filing a claim or applying for additional compensa­
tion. The offer of compensation must be made within three months follow-
95 . Moreteau & Lafay, supra note 1, �� 6- 15 ;  Moreteau, Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2, 
ii 29. 
96. Law No. 86- 1020 of Sept. 9, 1986 (art. 9), Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran9aise 
(J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Sept. 10, 1986, p. 1 0956 (amended by Law No. 87-1 060 of 
Dec. 30, 1 987 and Law No. 90-589 of July 6, 1 990 (art. 2), Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Fran9aise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France), July 1 1 , 1990). 
97. The amount is fixed annually by government decision. See C. INS. art. L422-4, ii I ,  avail­
able at http:/1195.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 38&r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
In 2008, the contribution is fixed at €3.30 per contract. See S.O.S. Attentats, Aide aux victims: 
Indemnisation, http://www .sos-attentats.org/aide-victimes-indernnisation.asp?lan_id=fr (last vis­
ited Mar. 28, 2008). 
98. C. INS. art. L422- l ,  available at http:// 1 95.83 . 177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=6 
398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). See also Fonds de Garantie (FOTI), Guarantee Fund for Victims 
of Acts of Terror and Other Offences, Conditions for Making a Claim to the FGTI: Acts of Terror­
ism, http://www.fgti.fr/anglais/terro/condition.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
99. C. INS. art. L422-l ,  ii I, available at http:// l95.83. l 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38& 
r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
100. Law No. 90-86 of Jan. 23, 1 990 (art. 26), Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Franyaise 
[J.0.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 25, 1 990. 
1 0 1 .  Moreteau & Lafay, supra note I ,  ii 15 .  
1 02.  C.  INS. art. L422-2, ii 3 ,  available a t  http:// l 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
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ing the filing of the claim. 1 03 Acceptance of the offer by the victim or the 
dependants subrogates the Fund in the claimant' s  rights for the amount 
paid. 104 However, it does not bar the victim from obtaining additional com­
pensation in a tort action. 105 Apart from damage to or loss of clothing, the 
Compensation Fund does not cover damage to property. 
B. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 
48. French law operates on the assumption that most citizens subscribe 
to first party insurance to cover possible damage to their property. How­
ever, homeowner insurance is not compulsory. Recent catastrophes re­
vealed that approximately up to 15% of victims of major disasters do not 
carry such insurance. 106 Yet, most people living in rented premises are re­
quested by the lessor to subscribe to insurance coverage called multirisque 
habitation, which covers most risks to the building, its contents, and the 
consequences of tortious acts committed by the insured or his dependants. 
Moreover, it is common practice for a landlord to request the prospective 
tenant to give evidence of such insurance before signing the lease. Private 
house and apartment owners also purchase such insurance, especially where 
the property is mortgaged. In fact, commercial lenders always request evi­
dence of such insurance. 
49. Under such policies, including first paW car insurance for the in­sured value of the car and property left in it, 10 insurance companies are 
bound by law to insure damages resulting from natural catastrophes. 108 The 
Insurance Code gives the following definition for natural catastrophes: 
Non insurable direct material damage whose determining cause was 
the abnormal intensity of a natural agent, when normal measures to be 
taken to protect against such damage have been unable to prevent the 
occurrence thereof or could not be taken, shall be deemed to be natural 
1 03. C. INS. art. L422- l ,  ii 3, available at http:// l 95.83. l 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r=6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 04. Id. 
1 05.  Moreteau & Lafay, supra note l, iJiJ 1 6-20 (discussing Cour de cassation, Chambre crimi­
nelle [Cass. Crim.] [court of cassation] Paris, Oct. 20, 1 993, 1 994, D. 280, note Anne 
d'Hauteville). 
1 06. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 8 1 .  
I 07. Third party car insurance is compulsory. In addition, a person may subscribe to first party 
insurance to cover damage caused to their car and property transported in the car. 
108. See Law No. 82-600 of July 13,  1982, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fram;:aise [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1 992, p. 1 87 (relating to the compensation of victims of natu­
ral catastrophes which are presently codified at C. INS. arts. L 1 25-l to -6). See also Moreteau, 
Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 19. 
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The catastrophe must be an abnormal phenomenon, a natural one not pro­
voked by human activity. It must also be of exceptional intensity or dura­
tion. For instance, continuous rain is not considered exceptional, but may 
become so if it lasts for a very long period. An unusual change in the eco­
system may also qualify. Lastly, it should be unavoidable, in the sense that 
the consequences may not be evaded by the taking of normal care. 1 10 As 
the Code puts it, the damage must be "non insurable."1 1 1  However, where 
an exceptional risk (one of those traditionally excluded before the creation 
of the compulsory system) is nonetheless covered by insurance, the more 
favorable coverage will of course apply. 
50. Another feature that appears in legal literature (though not ex­
pressly in the above-mentioned statutory definition) is that the disaster 
should be perceived as intolerable, in such a way that collective conscious­
ness compels it to be described as a natural catastrophe. 1 12 Floods, land­
slides, snowfalls, and droughts usually qualify. Tempests are usually cov­
ered by insurance but, as explained below, today they qualify when of 
outstanding magnitude. 1 13 In short, the catastrophe may be compared to 
fi 
. 1 J4 orce ma1eure. 
5 1 .  Victims may be compensated for the consequences of such risks 
under the compulsory scheme only where the Government recognizes and 
declares that there is a "natural catastrophe."1 15 This is done by way of ad­
ministrative order, stating the geographic zone and times affected by the 
natural catastrophe and the nature of the damages to be covered by the in­
surance. 1 1 6 This causes victims and local authorities to put the state gov­
ernment under pressure every time a disaster happens. Ministers, and even 
the President of the Republic, will promptly appear on the scene and prom­
ise an immediate declaration, so that the victims may be quickly compen­
sated. 
109. C. INS. art. L l25- l ,  � 3, available at http:/1 195.83 . 177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 10. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 19. 
1 1 1 .  C. INS. art. Ll25- l ,  � 3, available at http:/1 195.83 . 177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 12. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 19. 
1 1 3 .  Moreteau, Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2, � 19. 
1 14. Premiere chambre civile de la Cour de Cassation [Cass. l e  civ.] [first civil court of the 
court of appeal] Paris, July 7, 1998, RODA 1998, 841 ,  note Vincent. 
1 15. C. INS. art. L l25- 1 ,  � 4, available at http:/1195.83 . 177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 16 .  C. INS. art. Ll25-l ,  § 4 (as amended by Law No. 95-665 of July 16, 1992). 
2008] Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes 87 
52. Where no declaration of "natural catastrophe" is made, the insured 
may benefit only from coverage of the risks expressly covered under the in­
surance policy. In 1990, compulsory coverage was extended to damages 
caused by tempests, hurricanes, and cyclones for every policy covering the 
risk of fire. 1 1 7 There is no specific provision regarding floods. This means 
that damage caused by flooding may only be covered by the effect of an ex­
press stipulation in the contract or, failing express coverage, if the devastat­
ing event has been declared "natural catastrophe." 
53 .  It should be noted that compulsory coverage for damage to prop­
erty is not limited to natural disasters. Instead, it is also extended to man­
made catastrophes. For instance, insured victims of damage to property 
caused by terrorist attacks or bombing perpetrated on the French territory 
will benefit from full insurance coverage. Indeed, article L I  26-2 of the In­
surance Code makes such coverage compulsory: "Property insurance con­
tracts may not exclude the insurer's cover for damage as a result of terrorist 
attacks or bombing perpetrated on the national territory. Any clause to the 
contrary shall be deemed null and void."1 18 This reference to "property in­
surance contracts" includes housing insurance (multirisque habitation) as 
well as first party motor-vehicle insurance. 
54. Similar coverage has been extended to property damage caused by 
industrial disasters. For example, in response to a disaster that occurred on 
September 2 1 ,  2001 ,  when the explosion of a chemical plant called AZF 
(owned by Total Fina Elf) located in Toulouse killed thirty people, injured 
another 5,000 people, and devastated thousands of private and public build­
ings, 1 1 9 a new act was passed in July 2003 . Under this new act, designated 
as Law no. 2003-699 of 30 July 2003, 120 first party insurance coverage was 
extended to damage caused by industrial catastrophes. 
55.  In response to the passage of this act, new articles, L. 128- 1 to 128-
4, were added to the Insurance Code to set the framework of the new 
mechanism. Under this revision, an official statement must recognize that 
there is a "situation of technological catastrophe," as defined in the 
117. Law No. 90-509 of 25 July 1 990, Code des assurances, art. Ll22-7. Such coverage may 
not be excluded and applies where no declaration of "natural catastrophe" has been made. How­
ever, this does not apply where the winds "have reached or exceeded 1 45 kilometers an hour on 
average over ten minutes or 2 1 5  kilometers an hour in gusts," in which case compensation is not 
due under the contract unless a declaration of "natural catastrophe" has been made. 
1 18. C. INS. art. L l26-2, available at http:// 1 95.83.l 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r= 
6263 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 19. For further information, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ml 8 1 -82. 
1 20. Law No. 03-699 of July 30, 2003. 
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Code. 121 Only accidents occurring in specific "classified" plants (installa­
tions classees ), causing damages to a large number of buildings, are taken 
into account. This applies to first party motor vehicle and housing insur­
ance (multirisque habitation). 122 These provisions apply to all victims, 
whether they are private persons or businesses. Further, in such cases of a 
technological catastrophe, insurance companies are bound to make a com­
pensation proposal within three months after the victim asks for compensa­
tion or after the official statement declaring the catastrophe.123 When com­
pensation is paid, the insurer is subrogated into the victim's rights for any 
. . c. l 1 24 tort action agamst a party at 1au t. 
56. This new scheme is not meant to cover technological disasters 
caused by terrorist attacks. As explained above, 125 compensation of victims 
covered by first party insurance is compulsory and immediate and does not 
depend on an official statement recognizing the catastrophe situation. 
However, if there is doubt as to the cause of the catastrophe, it is not un­
usual for government authorities to be urged by the media and the gublic to 
make such recognition, in order to facilitate prompt compensation. 1 6 
57. Generally, for uninsured victims, the only way to obtain redress is 
to sue the owner of the plant in tort. However, the new law of 2003 allows 
the compensation of the uninsured victims of technological catastrophes by 
a Compensation Fund. 127 This compensation structure resembles solidarity, 
yet without a positive incentive to self-responsibility . 1 28 Such coverage by 
a compensation fund ought to be limited to people living in precarious con­
ditions, in order to cover their inexpensive losses. Thus, this limited exam­
ple may give a wrong image of the French system. As will be seen, in actu­
ality, its complex machinery of shifts and incentives offers a positive 
combination of solidarity and self-responsibility. 
1 2 1 .  C. INS. art. L 128- l ,  available at http:// 1 95.83. 1 77.9/code/Jiste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r= 
6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
122. C. INS art. L I  28-2, available at http:/1 1 95.83 . 1 77 .9/code/Jiste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r= 
6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
123.  Id. 
1 24. C. INS art. L l 28-3, available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r= 
6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 25 .  See supra � 55 .  
1 26. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 26. 
127. Code des assurances, art. L42 1 - 1 6. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 27. 
1 28 .  Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory Insurance of Loss to Property 
Caused by Natural Disasters:Competition or Solidarity?, WORLD COMPETITION, 2006, at 25, 26, 
available at http://amo.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=4663 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
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C. SHIFTS AND INCENTIVES 
58. The French system of compensation of victims of catastrophes is  
not funded out of tax revenue but by insurance premiums. With the excep­
tion of the compulsory social security system, first party insurance coverage 
is not mandatory. People are free to insure their property or not. Except in 
the few cases where uninsured risk is covered by a compensation fund, 129 
only those who insure their risks will benefit from coverage. 
59. The main (some would argue major) distortion to a purely market 
based system is  the compulsory coverage of risks linked to natural and 
man-made catastrophes at a regulated price. Under such a system, an addi­
tional amount is charged on the premium for every contract insuring prop­
erty, such as first-party automobile insurance and homeowner policlo, with 
the imposition of an additional amount fixed by State regulation. 1 0 The 
only shift in this system is related to technological catastrophes. Since 
January 1, 2004, an additional €5 is charged per year and per contract; thus, 
on the basis of the fifty million contracts existing at present, this means 
€250 million is levied every year in anticipation of the coverage of this 
risk. 13 1 Unlike the case of natural catastrophe, one is more likely to identify 
a liable party, and third party insurance might have been a better option. 
However, the present system is more protective of victims, since they will 
be covered even when the owners of the defective plants are insolvent. 1 32 
60. Reinsurance is a big part of the plan. This is provided through the 
Caisse centrale de reassurance ("CCR"), an entity acting under govern­
ment control. 133 Half the premiums levied to cover the consequences of ca­
tastrophes go to the CCR, which will always cover half the damage insured 
and pay for it. With this structure, the CCR is acting as a mutual fund, un­
der a very simple 50% rule, which balances the risk of catastrophes among 
all insurance companies. This national redistribution of risk is the hallmark 
129. As in the case of industrial disasters, see supra iJ 60. 
1 30. An additional 1 2% is charged on property insurance policies to cover natural catastrophes. 
Regarding automobile insurance, there is an additional 6% of the premium covering theft and fire 
and 0.5% of premiums relating to damage insurance. For further information, see Moreteau, Can­
narsa & F. Lafay, supra note 2, ii 5 1 .  
1 3 1 .  Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party Insurance, 
Soc. SCI. RES. NETWORK, Sept. 2007, at 29, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=l 086036 (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
1 32. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 5 1 .  Par Ann Michel, Les assureurs vont 
faire payer aux particuliers le risque industrie/, LE MONDE (Paris), Sept. 1 0, 2003. 
1 33. For additional information about the CCR, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 
ii 52. 
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of French national solidarity. 134 The CCR is itself covered by the State, 
which provides an unlimited guarantee. In the year 2000, for the first time 
in its history, the CCR had to call for the guarantee of the State. This was 
due to the combined cost of a drought, severe flooding in the South, and the 
two tempests in December 1 999. 1 35 
6 1 .  Another approach to victim compensation that should be men­
tioned is an initiative of private insurers. In 2002, the French insurance in­
dustry created a pool called GAREAT (Gestion de / 'assurance et de la re­
assurancedes risquesattentats et actes de terrorisme ), to reinsure damage to 
property caused by terrorist attacks. 1 36 The Pool GAREA T covers enter­
prises, local authorities, large buildings such as hospitals, and technological 
risk where the insured capital exceeds €6 million. 137 The system is organ­
ized in layers. The CCR appears at the third and fourth layers, with unlim­
ited state coverage through the CCR. Some may argue that the state offers 
reinsurance without charging premiums. However, the state contribution is 
meant to be a security or guarantee. The CCR always remains the principal 
debtor. 
62. Such an effort demonstrates that despite state intervention, the pri­
vate sector remains a primary actor and continues to operate on a free com­
petition basis. In essence, the state steps in to facilitate the coverage of the 
very large risk by pooling private money. In doing so, the state affords a 
financial guarantee to a privately capitalized system. Ex post state interven­
tion is limited to fixing the public infrastructure, which is usually done in a 
quick and efficient way. 
63 . Incentives to promote self-responsibility have been developed at 
1 34. The CCR also acts as a reinsurer for the French insurance companies; a victim may not 
call directly on the CCR. The CCR also protects insurance companies for the share they them­
selves are supposed to cover, through a stop-loss system. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra 
note 2, � 52. 
135 .  For a historical description of the CCR including references to the unprecedented events of 
the year 2000, see CAISSE CENTRALE DE REASSURANCE, LES CATASTROPHES NATURELLES EN 
FRANCE: NATURAL DISASTERS IN FRANCE 1 9, 24-26 (2005), available at http://www.ccr.fr/fr/pdf/ 
catnat_2005 .pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
1 36. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 53. 
1 37.  For a comprehensive description of the system, see GAREAT, Documentation, 
http://www.gareat.com/gareat/rtaccueil.nsf/documentation?Openpage; ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, 
INSTITUTE VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT, REPORT NO. 3: FINANCIAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE, § Commercial Terrorism Insurance in France (GAREAT), available at 
http://www.institut.veolia.org/en/cahiers/protection-insurability-terrorism/analysis-partnership/ter 
rorism-france.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). For an update on GAREAT in 2007, see Lloyd's 
Worldwide, France: GAREAT in 2007, http://www.lloyds.com/Lloyds_ Worldwide/International_ 
compliance_news/France_GAREAT_in_2007.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
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different levels. Examples can be found in relation to technological risks 
and natural catastrophes. In regards to technological risks, the law of July 
2003 created some exclusion zones around the high risk areas. Article 
L 128-4 of the Insurance Code introduces a limitation to the insurance cov­
erage that was made compulsory by the new law of 3 0  July 2003 when the 
existence of a technological catastrophe has been officially recognized. 
Under this limitation, insurance coverage is excluded for all buildings 
erected in special areas recognized in a prevention plan of technological 
risks (plan de prevention des risquestechnologiques) as causing a serious 
risk to human life, 138 if erected in such an area after the plan has been pub­
lished. Insurance coverage is also excluded for buildings erected in viola­
tion of administrative rules when the purpose of such rules is to prevent 
damages caused by a technological catastrophe. 139 This creates a clear in­
centive not to build in these special danger zones, where expropriation may 
be exercised, or to comply with protective administrative rules. When no 
expropriation has been exercised, insurance coverage in the special zones 
will only be granted to buildings existing before the publication of the plan. 
Further, when expropriation appears to be the only reasonable solution, 
fifty-percent of the compensation is paid for by state funds, and the other 
fifty-percent is paid for by local industry. 1 40 
64. When a disaster is declared a "natural catastrophe," the insured 
must bear a share of the loss, which remains uninsured (deductible or .fran­
chise). The amount of the deductible is fixed by the State. 141 In municipali­
ties not having adopted a "prevention of risk plan" (plan de prevention des 
risques), the deductible gets higher every time there is a declaration of natu­
ral catastrophe: twice as much the third time, three times as much the fourth 
time, and four times as much any additional times. 1 42 This creates an incen­
tive for the local population to press the municipality to adopt a prevention 
plan or to relocate to safer areas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
65. A careful study of the law and practice related to catastrophes 
shows that solidarity, public or private, always exists after a catastrophic 
event. In fact, such responses have even been described as excessive (by 
1 38. See C. ENV'T arts. LS l 5- 1 5  to 26 (especially note art. L5 l 5 - l 6). 
1 39. C. INS. art. L l 28-4 1 2, available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 
38&r=6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
1 40. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 1 68. 
1 4 1 .  C. INS. art. L l 25-2, , 2, L l25-3, 11 2, A l 25-l  annex II. See also Moreteau, Cannarsa & 
Lafay, supra note 2, 1 67. 
1 42. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 1 67. 
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comparison to other urgent, legitimate, and unsatisfied needs) after large 
scale catastrophes such as the South Asia Tsunami of December 26, 2004 
where some charities finally declared that they could no longer accept gifts 
for that purpose. However, nobody would question the shifts and distor­
tions to market rules where public money is spent in sometimes huge 
amounts after the event. In such cases, reason seems to be trumped by 
emotion. 
66. Yet, ex post state funding is raising major concerns that are not 
addressed in this Article. For instance, in Louisiana, the post Katrina and 
Rita question comes up repeatedly: "Where does the money go?" The 
ghost of corruption continues to linger. 
67. Solidarity may be organized ex ante, combining self­
responsibility, the resort to market forces, and state intervention. This 
cocktail is familiar even in the United States. True, the mix is not the same 
in Jacobin France and decentralized America, but careful analysis shows 
that it would be wrong to believe that there is always more state interven­
tion and public money spent in France than in the United States of America. 
The French tend to regulate insurance premiums but leave the onus on the 
insured, the state offering a financial guarantee behind a strong and healthy 
reinsurance system. 143 In contrast, Americans do not interfere with premi­
ums, but are more willing to inject public money directly where the levied 
premiums do not suffice. 
68. It is clear that prevention and solidarity must combine individual 
and collective action. 144 In every place where large-scale disasters have oc­
curred, market forces alone were never sufficient to entirely fix the prob­
lems. But, when properly combined, solidarity and self-responsibility ap­
pear to be the most desirable and respectable social values, justifying some 
distortion to competition rules. Law and economics scholars usually reject 
such views, and yet Roger Van den Bergh and Michael Faure find that effi­
ciency and solidarity may legitimize compulsory insurance coverage of loss 
of property caused by natural disasters: "[R]estrictions of competition may 
be presented as the price to pay for guaranteeing that victims of catastro­
phes are appropriately compensated."145 Such solutions should be on the 
143. On the financial health of the French Caisse centrale de reassurance, see Moreteau, Can­
narsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 52. 
144. For an alternative view, b asing the response on an international social insurance system, 
with a fund managed by the World Bank or under its control, see Jef Van Langendonck, Interna­
tional Socia/ Insurance for National Disasters?, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 1 83 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007). 
145 .Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 8 1 ,  iJ 51 (concluding that the French model, which has 
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agenda of every political ticket instead of solutions merely aimed at satisfy­
ing particular private interest groups. Comparative studies are useful in a 
world more and more prone to destructive disasters. Such studies show that 
there is no miracle recipe by highlighting that ad hoc and ex post solutions 
are less efficient and cause more distortions, and concluding that sound 
prevention lies in the art of mastering the mix of solidarity and self­
responsibility. 
69. This Article has addressed the issues of compensation and, to 
some extent, prevention. But there is much more to be done to that effect. 
Global warming is still denied by some, who do not want their activity to be 
identified as a cause. Political action is limited by the short horizon of re­
election. Part of the answer may be in collective action. But the engine to 
progress also lies in the individual. Why not sue politicians, private com­
panies, and their directors for making our planet an unlivable world for the 
generations to come? The law can be used for purposes going far beyond 
the satisfaction of selfish interests. Instead, it can also be a weapon to fight 
man-made disasters and protect our individual and collective future. 
been followed by a significant number of countries not covered in the present study, may 
benefit from a solidarity exception). 
